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CHASING THE CANNON: A TAIL'S VIEW 
OF, AND REQUESTS TO, THE DOG 
John E. Nowak* 
My admiration for the late Fred Rodell gives me an excuse, 
if not a reason, for keeping the number of footnotes in this 
document as small as possible.1 Otherwise I would, of course, 
have footnote references to the other articles in this Symposium, 
particularly Jerry Barron's article, "Capturing the Canon." 
Those articles have provided us with both an excellent overview 
of developments in the casebooks and rationales for the deci-
sions of casebook authors. 
There are as many "canons" of constitutional law as there 
are constitutional courses. Each student studies a canon that 
consists of the cases and materials used in her course. The stu-
dent believes that the materials presented by the professor, dis-
cussed in class, and "tested" on the examination constitute the 
principles that every law student and lawyer should know. It's 
my guess that the vast majority of professors who teach constitu-
tionallaw do not supplement the casebook materials with addi-
tional cases, or anything else. Most professors create a canon for 
their students by choosing a casebook and selecting the sections 
of the casebook that will be covered in the course. 
* David C. Baum Professor of Law, University of Illinois. 
1. In other essays, I have attempted to resurrect Professor Rodell's brand of legal 
realism in analyzing constitutional issues. See generally John E. Nowak, Professor Ro-
de/~ The Burger Court, and Public Opinion, 1 Canst. Comm.107 (1984); John E. Nowak, 
Foreword: Evaluating the Work of the New Libertarian Supreme Court, 7 Hastings Canst. 
L.Q. 263 (1980). Although one would never guess it by the number of footnotes in this 
short essay, I really hate footnotes. I made that point in John E. Nowak, Woe Unto You, 
Law Reviews!, 27 Ariz. L. Rev. 317 (1985). I take some solace in the fact that Judge Ab-
ner Mikva, a former student of Professor Rodell's, as well as a noted scholar and jurist, 
has also made some accommodation to the need to use notes to support statements in 
law reviews today. Because Judge Mikva is a person of more character than myself, he 
has made less of a departure from Professor Rodell's approach to legal writing than I 
have. Compare Abner J. Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 647 (1985) 
(arguing against the importance of footnotes in legal writing), with Abner J. Mikva and 
Jeff Bleich, When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 729 (1991) (using foot-
notes only as means of citation). 
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The authors of casebooks are the "big dogs" who create 
canons of constitutional law. The writers of reference works for 
students are the tails who follow the dogs as they wander 
through years and editions. Nevertheless, taking a look at where 
the tail has gone tells you something about what the dog has 
been doing. As the coauthor of a "one volume treatise," I've 
been in the business of tracking developments in constitutional 
law casebooks and courses for more than twenty years.2 [Here's 
an aside: Before I go further, I should tell you how hard it is for 
me-at least with a straight face-to call a one volume reference 
work, which is aimed primarily at a student audience, a "trea-
tise." Nevertheless, I'll go along with today's terminology]. 
In 1978, the late J. Nelson Young, Ron Rotunda, and I pub-
lished the first edition of our one volume treatise. The first edi-
tion of the book was only 974 pages in length and it had large 
typeface and wide margins. Yet that modest text covered almost 
all of the subjects that received significant attention in constitu-
tional law courses. There were not a lot of schools offering sepa-
rate first amendment or fourteenth amendment courses a quar-
ter century ago. In the "old days" most schools had only one 
constitutional law course. 
Many, though not all, of the changes in our book are direct 
reflections of changes in constitutional law courses in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century. The second edition of our 
book, published in 1983, had grown dramatically. We had re-
ceived a good response to the first edition from lawyers and 
judges, as well as from the student audience for which the first 
edition was aimed. In the second edition we added topics and 
lengthened our examination of some topics, in the foolish belief 
that we could write a single reference work that would serve all 
elements of the profession: students and professors, judges and 
lawyers. 
Jerry Barron played a part in changing the direction of our 
one volume treatise. In 1983 he was nice enough to include me 
in the planning committee for the constitutional law conference 
to which he refers to in his article. Some of the views presented 
in that conference, as well as discussions with a number of pro-
fessors around the country, led Ron Rotunda and me to decide 
that a single book could not serve the needs of both academe 
2. See John E. Nowak, Ronald D. Rotunda and J. Nelson Young, Constitutional 
LAw (West, 1978); John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional LAw (West, 
6th ed. 2000). 
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and the "real world." In 1986, we published the third edition of 
our one volume treatise; in that year we also published the first 
edition of our multi-volume Treatise on Constitutional Law: Sub-
stance and Procedure.3 
Our one volume treatise is very different from our multi-
volume Treatise. The Treatise is not designed to create, or re-
flect, a canon of constitutional law, though it should be of more 
help to constitutional law professors than our one volume work. 
The third edition of the multi-volume Treatise, which was pub-
lished last summer, fills five volumes and more than 3800 pages. 
The Treatise has yearly supplements, and more topics, more 
cases, and citations to a lot more law review articles than does 
our single volume work. Surprised that we include citations to 
most law review articles in the Treatise, but not our single vol-
ume text? You shouldn't be. Students, who are the primary us-
ers of any single volume treatise, will only consider a law review 
article important if it was discussed in their course. For that rea-
son, almost all references to law review articles will disappear 
from the sixth edition of our one volume treatise. 
The growing divergence between the contents of our one 
volume treatise [NK/A hornbook] and our Treatise reflects the 
different needs of judges and lawyers, on the one hand, and stu-
dents, on the other. Judge Edwards, and others, have com-
mented upon the growing divergence between what is taught in 
law school and the skills required of practicing lawyers.4 Profes-
sors Balkin and Levinson are unquestionably correct when they 
note that we need not be as concerned about the training of law-
yers in our constitutional law courses as professors should be in 
some other law school courses.5 Nevertheless, lawyers do run 
into constitutional questions, and judges must deal with those 
questions. Those lawyers and judges require information on a 
range of issues that no professor would include in the canon; 
they require citations to many, if not all, of the Supreme Court's 
decisions on each point. In serving the needs of judges and law-
yers in our Treatise, Ron and I have been able to avoid making 
3. Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Sub-
stance and Procedure (West, 3d ed. 1999, with 2000 Supplement). 
4. Contrast Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education 
and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992), with Sanford Levinson, Judge Ed-
wards' Indictment of "Impractical" Scholars: The Need for a Bill of Particulars, 91 Mich. 
L. Rev. 2010 (1993). 
5. J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 
Harv. L. Rev. 963, 1004 (1998). 
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decisions about which topics or cases should be included in a 
"canon." For example, Downes v. Bidwell,6 discussed in Levin-
son's article, touches on a variety of subjects that might come up 
in court cases; we include four references to that case in our 
multi-volume Treatise. That case only gets one footnote refer-
ence in our single volume treatise. 
What do students want from one volume treatises? What 
differentiates one volume treatises from other "study aids"? 
The student's primary interest, of course, is in getting help in 
understanding the materials in a way that will allow him or her 
to get a higher grade for the course. The difference between any 
of the one volume treatises and other types of study aids, such as 
commercial outlines, is two-fold. First, a one volume treatise, 
unlike some "study aids," will give the student information con-
cerning how principles were developed (thus touching on some 
of the concerns raised by Maxwell Steams in his article). Sec-
ond, a one volume treatise needs to be as comprehensive as pos-
sible, because it is designed to be used by students in many types 
of courses. I cannot speak for the writers of other one volume 
treatises, but Ron and I only drop a topic from our one volume 
work when we are fairly certain that it is not being taught in con-
stitutional law courses across the country. We cut back dramati-
cally in our coverage of a topic only if we have determined that 
the topic is no longer getting significant attention in those 
courses. 
Over the years, a number of topics have disappeared from 
basic constitutional law courses. Based on the content of consti-
tutional law courses in the late 1980s and early 1990s, our fifth 
edition (published in 1995) almost completely eliminated cover-
age of some topics, including: Article I powers of Congress other 
than the commerce and fiscal powers; immigration and naturali-
zation; federal government immunity from state regulation; and 
state taxation. We also significantly reduced our coverage (es-
sentially by eliminating reference to cases that no longer appear 
in constitutional law case books) of topics such as: congressional 
enforcement of civil rights; foreign affairs; presidential immuni-
ties and powers; and procedural due process. 
Ron and I have not made a final decision regarding the 
topics that will receive significantly reduced coverage in the sixth 
edition of our one volume treatise, which will be published in the 
6. 182 u.s. 244 (1901). 
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fall of 2000. Among the top candidates for reduced coverage 
are: most pre-1960s cases concerning alienage, gender, and ille-
gitimacy classifications; procedural due process; the one person-
one vote cases; and most of the ballot access cases. Indeed, we 
may drop some of the "specialized" religious clause topics (such 
as judicial inquiry into religious "frauds" and judicial involve-
ment in intra-sect disputes), because, despite the growing num-
ber of First Amendment courses, those topics do not appear in 
many casebooks. 
Why has our one volume treatise grown in size, while Ron 
and I have been reducing coverage of some topics? Topics that 
have received reduced coverage in our one volume treatise are 
the topics that have given way, in most casebooks and courses, to 
more "in-depth" coverage of fundamental rights topics, particu-
larly the right to privacy, and post-1968 equal protection cases. 
I assume that casebooks follow the "market force" of pro-
fessorial preferences. If so, the changes in topics covered in 
most casebooks must meet with the approval of most law profes-
sors. Nevertheless, I believe that there are at least three major 
omissions from the canon that law students study. There are 
three areas that I believe casebook authors should add to their 
texts, so that these topics might become part of the canon pre-
sented to most students. The remainder of this paper consists of 
three requests to the casebook authors. If these topics do not 
get significant coverage in casebooks and courses, we cannot add 
them to our one volume reference work. My three suggestions 
are made in ascending order of their importance (to me, that is). 
[What, another "aside"? I must give you the same warning 
that I always give my students at the start of each course. Each 
semester, I make the statement that: "Every law school should 
have at least one came-of-age in the 1960s, white guilt, knee jerk 
liberal. You're looking at one right now." The suggestions to 
casebook authors, below, are made by a professorial dinosaur 
who's trying to survive the ice age of law-and-economics, and 
new-speak constitutional law terminology that might make John 
Marshall spin in his grave.7] 
7. After all, John Marshall thought that he, not Madison, was a Federalist. Prior 
to the ratification of the Constitution, all those persons who supported ratification (in-
cluding all of the writers of Federalist Papers) were referred to as Federalists; those per-
sons who opposed ratification were referred to as Anti-Federalists. After ratification of 
the Constitution, Federalists were persons, such as John Marshall, who were members of 
the Federalist political party. The Federalists were opposed by a political party known as 
the Democratic-Republicans (which was also called the Democrats, the Republicans, or 
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1. STATE TAXATION AND INTER-GOVERNMENTAL TAX 
IMMUNITY CASES 
There is no reason to lament the absence of materials on the 
details of commerce clause and due process clause limitations on 
specific types of state taxes such as franchise taxes, inheritance 
taxes, or income taxes. Nevertheless, I believe that casebooks 
should include the cases that establish basic commerce clause 
principles that apply to all forms of state taxes. The inclusion of 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,8 which established the 
modem four-part test for judging the compatibility of any state 
or local tax with dormant commerce clause principles, and Quill 
Corp. v. North Dakota,9 which recast earlier due process rulings 
as commerce clause decisions, are important for two reasons. 
First, reviewing basic state taxation cases will give the students a 
better perspective on the debate among the Justices concerning 
the extent to which they should strike state laws under the 
"dormant" or "negative" commerce clause. Second, these cases 
show the students that the Court is willing to defer to Congress 
concerning the limitation, or expansion, of a state's taxing 
power, a subject of increasing importance in an age of when eco-
nomic transactions are being done at computer keyboards. 
Classroom discussion of Sugreme Court cases concerning 
intergovernmental tax immunity 0 would help prepare the stu-
dents for a discussion of federal-state relationships, and the 
competency of the judiciary to structure those relationships. 
Casebooks should include excerpts from, or a text description of, 
the cases in which the Court attempted to carve out an area of 
immunity from federal taxes for state "governmental" activities ( 
as opposed to "proprietary" activities). All the casebooks in-
clude an excerpt from Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in 
the Anti-Federalists in various portions of the country). The Anti-Federalists, who had 
opposed the Constitution, were a dying political group. The Democratic-Republicans 
espoused a modified version of the Anti-Federalist philosophy; they mirrored the Anti-
Federalists in their opposition to the Federalists' political philosophy. Everyone knows 
about the Federalists. For information about the Anti-Federalists, and their opposition 
to the constitution, see generally Cecilia M. Kenyon, ed., The Antifederalists (Bobbs-
Merrill Co., 1966); Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Complete Anti-Federalist (U. Chicago 
Press, 1981). 
8. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
9. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). For an examination of constitutional limits on state taxes, 
see Rotunda and Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law Ch. 13 (cited in note 3). 
10. For an examination of intergovernmental tax immunity cases, see Rotunda and 
Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law§ 13.9 at 467-505 (cited in note 3). 
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Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,u stating 
that the Court had found the government-proprietary function 
distinction to be unworkable, and a description of the ruling in 
Massachusetts v. United States.12 However, I doubt that students, 
based on the materials in most casebooks, can fully appreciate 
the amount of effort that went into the Court's attempt to create 
an area of state sovereignty that would be protected from federal 
taxation and the complete failure of that attempt. Inclusion of 
those cases may lead to a better class discussion of whether the 
Court should resurrect National League of Cities v. Usery. 13 
Most casebooks have omitted the subject of federal gov-
ernment immunity from state taxation and regulation. Reading 
the cases prohibiting direct taxation of the federal government, 
and cases endorsing Congress's ability to prohibit even non-
discriminatory taxes on persons receiving income from the fed-
eral government, would give students another chance to evaluate 
"sovereignty" issues. The canon presented to the students 
should provide material for student evaluation of competing 
viewpoints. Unfortunately, many casebooks make New York v. 
United States14 and Printz v. United States15 seem like "revealed 
truth." Inclusion of cases covering state taxation, and federal 
immunity from state law, would better prepare students to par-
ticipate in, and evaluate, discussions of federalism issues. 
2. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
Every constitutional law course (or any course on the Four-
teenth Amendment) should include the topic that has come to 
be called procedural due process. The procedural due process 
topic divides into two subtopics: (1) the Court's definition of life, 
liberty and property; and, (2) the type of procedures that will be 
deemed fair process if the government is going to deprive an in-
dividual of a life, liberty or property. 
As Jerry Barron has noted, there may be only a slight loss in 
the student's education by giving little to the second of the two 
subtopics. The concept of fair process is the focus of both ad-
ministrative law courses and criminal procedure courses. On the 
other hand, omission of class discussion regarding the Supreme 
11. 469 u.s. 528 (1985). 
12. 435 u.s. 444 (1978). 
13. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
14. 505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
15. 521 u.s. 898 (1997). 
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Court's approach to defining life, liberty, and property leaves 
students with an insufficient basis for evaluating the Rehnquist 
Court's treatment of civil liberties generally. 
Examining how the Court uses the "entitlement" and "pre-
sent enjoyment" concepts to define the property interests that it 
will protect, in a procedural setting, allows the student to see the 
Court's rulings concerning taking of property, and substantive 
due process, in perspective. This point can best be made by ref-
erence to two cases, one of which made all of the casebooks and 
one of which was mentioned in very few of the casebook sup-
plements. 
Virtually all of the casebooks, or the casebook authors' 
supplements thereto, have an excerpt from Eastern Enterprises v. 
Apfe/,16 wherein the Court, without majority opinion, invalidated 
an arguably retroactive assessment on a corporation, which had 
not owned a coal mine for many years, for payments to a welfare 
and retirement fund for coal miners. Very few of the casebooks 
pointed out that the company that seemed to be victimized (if 
one read only the plurality and concurring opinions) had oper-
ated the coal mine through a subsidiary after it formally got out 
of the coal mining business. The "victimized" parent corpora-
tion had made a profit, from the effort of coal miners, that was 
many times the millions of dollars in benefit payments it would 
have had to pay into the fund if the application of the Coal Act 
to this corporation had been upheld by the Court. 
Almost none of the casebook supplements that I could find 
[admittedly, I don't have all of them in my office] included a 
major excerpt from American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Sullivan.17 In that case the Court ruled: (1) private insur-
ance companies' denial of workers' compensation payments to 
injured workers did not constitute "state action"; and (2) due 
process standards would not limit, in any way, the state statutes 
establishing a dispute resolution system to resolve disagreements 
between an injured worker (who believed that his request for 
payment for medical treatment was justified) and an insurance 
corporation (who refused to make payment because the insur-
ance company thought the medical treatment was not neces-
sary). Most of the casebooks (with the exception of Cohen and 
Varae8) have only a short reference to American Manufacturer's 
16. 524 u.s. 498 (1998). 
17. 119 s. a. 977 (1999). 
18. William Cohen and Jonathan D. Varat, 1999 Supplement, Constitutional Law: 
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Mutual Insurance in their state action chapter. The most impor-
tant aspect of the case was the Rehnquist Court's ruling that the 
state statutory system for resolving disputes between injured 
workers and the insurance corporations was subject to absolutely 
no due process standards. Even though the injured workers had 
qualified for workers' compensation benefits, the Court ruled 
that an injured worker had no "entitlement" to payment for 
medical treatment before the company agreed that treatment 
was reasonable and necessary. Because no property interest was 
at stake, the majority refused to apply any due process principles 
to the dispute resolution system. Unless the students have seen 
the Court's refusal to apply any due process standards to the 
resolution of an injured worker's claim, are they adequately pre-
pared to discuss the issue of whether Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel 
represents a desire of some Justices to recreate "Lochner Era" 
protection of business interests? 
While many of the case books have significant excerpts from 
Supreme Court cases defining property, very few have more 
than a page or two concerning the Supreme Court's approach to 
defining "liberty" for procedural due process purposes. This 
omission is understandable, because many of the key cases in the 
area are so-called "prisoner's rights cases." However, these 
cases allow a student to develop a sense of how Justices (as op-
posed to a "person on the street"or philosophers) define liberty. 
Comparing cases in which the Court's ruling that a prisoner has 
no liberty interest at stake when he is transferred to a prison in a 
state far from his home (so that he will never be visited by his 
relatives) with the cases in which the Court has found that pris-
oners had liberty interests at stake when prison authorities were 
going to transfer the prisoner to a psychiatric care facility for in-
voluntary administration of anti-psychotic drugs, helps students 
focus on how they would define the term "liberty" if they were 
judges instead of students. 
The failure to consider the Court's definition of liberty in 
procedural due process cases deprives the students of an ade-
quate basis to evaluate the Court's definition of liberty in sub-
stantive due process and equal protection cases. In the 1960s 
and 1970s the Court seemed to assume that virtually all activity 
was part of the liberty protected by the due process clauses. In 
those decades, laws restricting liberty generally would enjoy a 
Cases and Materials 150-51 (Foundation Press, lOth ed. 1999). 
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presumption of constitutionality and be subject only to minimal 
judicial scrutiny. The Court would only closely scrutinize the 
impairment of an individual's ability to engage in some activity, 
if the activity was deemed a "fundamental constitutional right." 
In the 1980s and 90s, the Court has sometimes talked about 
whether a right should receive judicial protection in terms of 
whether the asserted right is a part of "liberty." Plurali~ and 
majorit~ opinions (in cases such as Michael H./9 Bowers, and 
Cruzan 1) talk about the rights whose impairment would trigger 
independent judicial review as being forms of liberty. These 
opinions could lead a reader to believe that a restriction of any 
activity that constituted "liberty" would receive close judicial 
scrutiny, and that non-liberty activities were left unprotected by 
the Constitution. If students had talked about the concept of 
liberty when discussing procedural fairness, they might find 
some of these Rehnquist Court cases even more confusing than 
they do in most constitutional law courses. On the bright side, 
however, the students would understand that confusion about 
the concept of liberty exists within the Supreme Court. 
Confusion concerning the word liberty was at the core of 
two Supreme Court rulings from last spring. In City of Chicago 
v. Morales,12 Justice Stevens wrote for a majority in ruling that a 
Chicago ordinance that gave police officers the right to order 
certain persons to disperse if they were "loitering" in a public 
place was so vague that it violated due process. Justice Stevens 
wrote for only a plurality of judges when he described the activi-
ties of persons on street comers as a part of the liberty protected 
by the due process clause. The dissenters in Morales attacked 
Justice Stevens' position that walking down a street, or standing 
on a street comer, was part of our "liberty."23 Justice Stevens, in 
his plurality opinion, was not advocating close judicial scrutiny of 
laws that regulated the times when people could walk down the 
street or the number of people who could stand on a street cor-
ner. Rather, the plurality opinion only asserted that walking and 
standing on a public sidewalk were liberty interests that required 
the government to provide persons with adequate notice re-
garding forms of walking and standing that it was making crimi-
19. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
20. Bowers v. Hardwick,418 U.S.l86 (1986). 
21. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
22. 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999}. 
23. Id. at 1867-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1879-87 (Thomas, J., joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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nal. Students who had not discussed the definition of liberty in 
procedural due process cases would have difficulty understand-
ing Justice Stevens' views, and the worth (or lack thereof) of the 
dissenting opinions. 
Justice Stevens avoided the tricky problem of defining lib-
erty when he wrote an opinion for seven Justices in Saenz v. 
Roe.24 The Court in Saenz for the first time employed the privi-
leges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to in-
validate a restriction on civil liberties. (The Court once used the 
privileges or immunities clause to restrict economic classifica-
tions, but repudiated that position within a few years.) If a stu-
dent understood the difficulty the Court had faced in defining 
liberty in both procedural and substantive due process cases, the 
student could better understand why seven Justices might have 
chosen to resurrect the privileges or immunities clause, rather 
than to attempt to define the types of liberty interests that would 
trigger close judicial scrutiny. 
As we prepare the sixth edition of our one volume treatise, 
Ron and I are confronting the question of whether we should 
drastically cut back on our coverage of procedural due process. 
If we drop most of procedural due process from our one volume 
work, we will still examine the entire topic in the multi-volume 
Treatise, but that Treatise is not used by students. I hope that 
the next round of casebooks will have greater coverage of the 
procedural due process, so that we can justify examining that 
important topic in our reference work for students. 
3. THE SUPREME COURT'S RULINGS ON RACE AND 
ALIENAGE IN THE JIM CROW ERA 
An examination of the casebooks used in most constitu-
tional law courses leads me to believe that we have totally failed 
to prepare our students to discuss intelligently the role of the ju-
diciary in protecting, or harming, racial minorities. The basic 
canon presented to every law school class in this country should 
include cases, and other materials, regarding the mistreatment of 
racial minorities from the 1860s to the 1950s, in addition to the 
post World War II cases that appear in all the casebooks. 
Most casebooks portray the Court as a passive participant in 
the tremendous harm that was caused to racial and ethnic mi-
norities during the post Reconstruction and Jim Crow era. 
24. 119 s. a. 1518 (1999). 
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Casebooks will include an excerpt from Plessy v. Ferguson25 and 
a misleading quote from Justice Harlan's dissent (who men-
tioned color-blindness only once).26 Only a few casebooks have 
excerpts from the Court's rulings creating the separate and une-
qual principle, such as the case allowing a county to have schools 
only for white children if the county could not "afford" a sepa-
rate school for minority race children.27 
Even more important than any omissions regarding the 
Court's role in developing its separate and unequal principle, is 
the omission of the Court's role in destroying the effectiveness of 
the Reconstruction era statutes protecting racial minorities. The 
Supreme Court is not solely to blame for the failure to protect 
the rights of minority race persons. The Congress in the 1890s 
repealed important provisions of the post-Civil War legislation. 
But the Court was a leader, not merely a follower, in the destruc-
tion of federal protections for racial minorities. 
All of the casebooks have an excerpt from the Civil Rights 
Cases /2, but most of the case books highlight only the portion of 
the decision concerning "state action." Rare is the casebook 
that notes that portion of the Supreme Court opinion in the Civil 
Rights Cases in which the majority discusses the conflict between 
the statutes and the view of federalism embodied in the Tenth 
Amendment.29 
How can students intelligently evaluate discussions of using 
"original intention" to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, 
unless they have materials in their "canon" that contradict the 
majority's view in the Civil Rights Cases? The Johnson Admini-
stration had objected to the Fourteenth Amendment precisely 
because it was giving wide-ranging power to Congress to protect 
minority races and to regulate aspects of state law that had been 
the province of the states prior to the Civil War. Students 
should know that the Johnson Administration's views were re-
ported, and rejected, by a number of newspapers in the north. 
As the editors of the New York Herald said in 1866: "[The John-
25. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
26. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-
Reading Justice Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizen-
ship, 1992 U. Dl. L. Rev. 961; Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Mytk· Justice Harlan and the 
Chinese Cases, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 151 (1996). 
27. See Cumming v. Board of Education, 115 U.S. 528 (1899) (majority opinion by 
Justice Harlan). · 
28. 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
29. Id. at 14-15. 
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son Administration's fear] is that this amendment in its opera-
tion will do away with State sovereignty, legislative and judicial, 
and will put the legislatures of our court of the several States un-
der Congress and the federal courts . . . . we hold that this old 
Southern theory of our government was demolished at Peters-
burg and surrendered at Appomattox Court House ... "30 
Your students are going to go to meetings in their law 
schools with professors who will talk about "original intent" and 
"federalism" as if the Civil War had never happened and the 
Civil War Amendments were meant to do nothing to a pre-war, 
Southern view of federal-state relations. The canon you present 
to the students should let them consider the other side of the ar-
gument. 
Of the casebooks I examined, only the Stone, Seidman, 
Sunstein and Tushnet casebook had text examining the setting of 
the nineteenth century Supreme Court cases invalidating civil 
rights laws, and the effect of those rulings on racial minorities.31 
All students should have information regarding the slaughter of 
black persons in Louisiana that led to the prosecutions in United 
States v. Cruikshank.32 The students should understand the im-
pact of cases such as United States v. Harris,33 which prevented 
the federal government from punishing conspiracies to obstruct 
government actors from giving protection to racial minorities. 
The Court did uphold some of the Reconstruction legisla-
tion, but its rulings, as a whole, helped pave the way for violence 
against minorities. I would not claim that the Court's rulings 
caused white mobs in the 1920s to kill hundreds of black persons 
in Tulsa, or to destroy Rosewood, Florida.34 The Court's rulings 
30. The N.Y. Herald 6 (Oct. 25, 1866). Similar sentiments can be found in The Cin-
cinnati Commercial 1 (Oct. 26, 1866) and N.Y. Times 4 (Oct. 25, 1866). See John E. 
Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Cause of Action Against State Gov-
ernments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 
1413,1457-58,1462-63 (1975). 
31. Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., Constitutional Law 508-12 (Little, Brown & Co., 3d 
ed. 1996). 
32. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). For an account of the violence that was the background for 
this litigation, see Brooks D. Simpson, This Bloody and Monstrous Crime, Constitution 
38 (Fall1992). 
33. 106 u.s. 629 (1882). 
34. Information concerning the Tulsa race riot of 1921 was provided by Professor 
AI Brophy who has given me a draft of his article, tentatively titled "Reconstructing the 
Dreamland: Contemplating Civil Rights Actions and Reparations for the Tulsa Race 
Riot of 1921." The State of Florida has taken action to compensate the remaining survi-
vors and descendants of persons murdered in the 1923 "Rosewood Massacre." See 1994 
Florida Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 94-359, available in Westlaw, FL-LEGIS-OLD file. Profes-
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were not a "but for" cause of the almost 5000 documented 
lynchings that occurred between the Jim Crow Era and the 1970s 
when the federal government stopped tallying the total number 
of lynchings in this country (perhaps out of national embarrass-
ment).35 Nevertheless, I believe that students must be presented 
with information about the Supreme Court cases restricting or 
overturning civil rights legislation. Without that information, 
how can they evaluate the Supreme Court's role in our society? 
How can the students really evaluate the Rehnquist Court's 
rulings restricting the ability of the federal government to re-
quire certain states to engage in race conscious districting, unless 
they have seen the Court's nineteenth century invalidation of 
some federal statutes protecting the right to vote of minority 
race persons?36 This fall, the Supreme Court heard oral argu-
ments, for the second time, in Reno v. Bossier Parish School 
Board.n Shouldn't all constitutional law students know that they 
may be witnessing a "replay" of the nineteenth century Supreme 
Court rulings? The canon should prepare our students for an in-
formed discussion of whether we should expect any less devas-
tating effects from the Court's dismantling of civil rights legisla-
tion at the end of the twentieth century than the effects of 
similar rulings by the Court in the nineteenth century. 
The articles by Sandy Levinson and Jerry Barron provide 
support for my request that casebook authors include materials 
regarding the Court's dismantling of Reconstruction era civil 
sor Brophy also provided me with the reference to the Florida compensation legislation. 
35. There appear to have been, by a conservative estimate, almost 5000 lynchings of 
racial minorities. Tuskegee University Lynching Reports (unpublished}. The state-by-
state lynching estimates contained in the Tuskegee University study are quoted in Mark 
Mayfield and Tom Watson, Guilt, Innocence Blur with Passage of Time, USA Today 2A 
(Sept. 25, 1992); see also U.S. Bureau of the Census, The Statistical History of the United 
States: From Colonial Times to the Present 422 (Basic Books, Inc., 1976) (showing the 
number of persons lynched, by race, from 1882 to 1970). 
36. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875). 
37. 120 S. a. 866 (2000). After the date of our conference, the Supreme Court in-
terpreted the Voting Rights Act so as to prohibit the Department of Justice from denying 
"preclearance" to changes in voting laws that were adopted with the intent to discrimi-
nate against minority race voters if the changes did not, in fact, reduce the voting power 
of racial minorities. The case was decided by a 5 to 4 vote of the Justices. Not surpris-
ingly, the five Justices in the Bossier Parish majority were the same five Justices who had 
found that white voters could challenge a legislative district drawn to protect minority 
race voting power even though white voters were over-represented in a legislative dele-
gation after the creation of the district that was designed to protect minority race voters. 
For an analysis of the racial attitudes of these Justices see John E. Nowak, The Rise and 
Fall of Supreme Court Concern for Racial Minorities, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 345 (1995); 
John E. Nowak, The Gang of Five & the Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Su-
preme Court, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1091 (2000). 
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rights laws. For all the reasons set out by Sandy Levinson, the 
Insular Cases38 should be included in casebooks and used in con-
stitutional law courses. Inclusion of those cases will help stu-
dents understand the Supreme Court's attitude toward people 
who were "different." That attitude was also evident in the 
Court's rulings concerning civil rights legislation. 
Jerry Barron notes, and regrets, the decreasing amount of 
coverage in casebooks given to United States citizenship classifi-
cations. Significant treatment of alienage classifications, includ-
ing pre-1970 decisions, should appear in the basic canon pre-
sented to students for two reasons. First, these cases can help 
students understand why the phrase "undocumented person," is 
not a "politically correct" phrase. It is the constitutionally cor-
rect phrase. The students should understand the relationship of 
the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment to the alienage 
decisions. The cases denying any significant protection under 
the equal protection clause for undocumented persons (all of the 
Court's decisions other than Plyler v. Doe39 have the effect of 
disadvantaging a large number of persons in this country who 
are citizens, but who can't document their citizenship). 
Second, examination of the history of how alienage classifi-
cations were used by state governments, and the Court's ap-
proval of such state activity, sheds light (though not a kind one) 
on the Court's position regarding racial classifications through-
out most of our history. Students may not know about the por-
tion of our history when persons from certain parts of the world 
who immigrated into our country could never become natural-
ized citizens. Students can't fully evaluate the Court's position 
regarding racial classifications if they do not know that alienage 
classifications were used, particularly on the West Coast, to vic-
timize Asian immigrants and their children (even children who 
were born in the U.S. and, therefore, were U.S. citizens). Stu-
dents should know that the Supreme Court created a "special 
public interest" doctrine that allowed states to exclude non-
citizens from owning land, or engaging in certain types of busi-
ness activities. These cases, in effect, created a "Plessy era" for 
Asian Americans. The Court didn't back away from this ap-
proach until1948; the special public interest concept didn't com-
pletely disappear until 1970. It may have reappeared, in a dif-
ferent form, in the late 1970s when the Court allowed New York 
38. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
39. 457 u.s. 202 (1982). 
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to limit public school teaching positions to U.S. citizens. The 
Court's limitation of at least one aspect of the right to travel to 
U.S. citizens, in Saenz v. Roe, continues a sad tradition.40 
Most of the casebooks select cases concerning alienage clas-
sifications and racial discrimination that give students the im-
pression that the Supreme Court was always "the good guy." All 
the casebooks include the Court's nineteenth century rulings in-
validating the most blatant forms of discrimination against racial 
and ethnic minorities (cases such as Yick Wo and Strauder). The 
Court's rulings that provided assistance to states, and private 
persons, in harming persons of color don't appear in most case-
books. Perhaps most casebook authors believe that such cases 
belong in courses on civil rights enforcement, critical race stud-
ies, or immigration and naturalization. I believe that all students 
who have taken a basic constitutional law course should be pre-
pared to discuss the question of whether "judicial review" [which 
they fall in love with early in law school] has helped or hurt ra-
cial minorities. If the canon presented to the students included 
more of the Court's history, rather than focusing only on post 
World War II rulings, students would realize that there is no 
clear answer to that question. The canon(s) of constitutional law 
should include materials that help students understand the diffi-
culty of answering that question. 
40. Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999}. Justice Stevens' majority opinion makes it 
clear that the new decision only protects U.S. citizens. ld. at 1526, 1530. See generally 
Chin, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 151 (cited in note 26). 
